Monetary Integration Ahead of Trade Integration in East Asia? by Shin, Kwanho & Wang, Yunjong
Discussion Paper No. 572 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MONETARY INTEGRATION AHEAD OF 
TRADE INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA? 
 
 
 
Kwanho Shin 
and 
Yunjong Wang 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
March 2003 
 
 
The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
Final Draft 
 
Monetary Integration Ahead of Trade Integration  
in East Asia?+ 
 
Kwanho Shin* and Yunjong Wang** 
 
October 2002 
 
Abstract 
 
Regionalism is taking two forms. It is occurring firstly through free trade 
arrangements and secondly through monetary arrangements.  In this paper, 
we highlight the issues related to the reversal of sequence between trade 
integration (free trade agreement) and monetary integration (a monetary 
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many good reasons for forming a monetary union before a free trade 
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1. Introduction 
 
While a flexible exchange rate regime is the trend in one direction, there is also a 
movement toward the other extreme of a credible bilateral or multilateral parity-fixing 
regime. As there is renewed emphasis on price stability, the sanctity of “one country, 
one money” has come into question (Alesina and Barro, 2002). In particular, the 
formation of the European monetary union, in which twelve countries have adopted the 
same currency, has given rise to an intense debate on monetary union. 
 The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which East Asian countries can 
introduce a monetary union. More specifically, we will try to answer the question of 
whether East Asia can introduce a monetary union without making an effort to further 
trade integration through a formal free trade agreement (FTA). To put monetary union 
ahead of trade integration is the opposite sequence to the strategy followed by the 
European Union. In Europe, a trade-integration-first strategy was natural when six 
nations in Europe singed the historic Treaty of Rome in March 1957, which set in 
motion the economic and political integration of Western Europe. No serious thought 
was given to setting up a regional exchange rate coordination mechanism or the 
possibility of introducing a common currency, simply because the Bretton Woods 
system provided stability for the European countries. Only when the Bretton Woods 
system began to unravel, the pressure for exchange rate stability intensified and thus the 
European countries started to initiate monetary integration.  
 Unlike Europe, however, trade agreements among East Asian countries are slow to 
materialize and are subject to severe domestic political resistance. Furthermore, 
conventional integration process may not work because a formal FTA at the regional 
level would be disrupted by the exchange rate instability unless an effective exchange 
rate coordinating mechanism is put in place. A point of reference can be found in the 
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), where economic integration process 
came to a deadlock due to frequent currency crises. In contrast to conventional 
regionalism through trade integration, monetary regionalism can contribute to the 
stability of currencies and financial markets without having to formalize trade linkages. 
 Since the financial crisis, East Asian countries have had a strong impetus to search 
for a regional cooperative mechanism that could help secure financial stability in the 
region. This search is now gathering momentum and opening the door to possibly 
significant policy-led integration in East Asia. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) of 
ASEAN+3 is one such available option. At present, however, East Asian countries have 
not yet specified a common policy goal in the area of a future exchange rate system in 
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the region. Even the CMI has nothing to do with exchange rate coordination, given the 
diverse exchange rate systems in East Asia. 
 When the regional group agrees on deepening regional integration through 
exchange rate coordination, monetary policy coordination becomes a crucial element in 
the broad context of financial and monetary cooperation. Recently, some observers have 
anticipated that East Asia will be successful in its attempt to jump into monetary 
cooperation ahead of building up the trade agreements, while many others are still 
skeptical. 
 Based on theory and empirical evidence, this paper explores the issues related to 
the reversed sequencing between trade and monetary integration. We organize our 
discussion as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the strategy adopted by European 
countries towards the European monetary union. Section 3 then points to the different 
situation faced by East Asian countries.  Section 4 examines whether East Asia satisfies 
the optimum currency area (OCA) criteria. Section 5 discusses the issues related to the 
reversed sequence of introducing monetary integration ahead of trade integration in East 
Asia. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Europe’s Experience: Trade Integration ahead of Monetary 
Integration 
 
Since World War II, European countries have identified exchange rate stability as a key 
policy target. However, no serious thought was given to creating a regional exchange 
rate coordination mechanism, simply because the Bretton Woods system could provide 
stability for the European currencies.  
 The great event in Europe in the late 1950s was the formation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). In March 1957, six European countries signed the Treaty 
of Rome to build a customs union and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). As a 
first step, the Treaty of Rome committed the six member countries to eliminate trade 
barriers within the Community and to establish a Common Commercial Policy (CCP), 
thereby creating a customs union. On the other hand, the Six moved forward with the 
CAP, which entailed freer trade within Europe but greater insulation of European 
agricultural markets from external competition. 
 The main issue for the Community in the monetary area in the 1960s was the 
question of whether exchange rate adjustments could disrupt the functioning of the 
customs union and the CAP. In Europe, it was of utmost importance to defend regional 
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parities from the beginning. The IMF has taken over this concern and supported 
securing the system of fixed exchange rates and balance of payments. The European 
countries did not have much to do in the monetary area.  
 In the later 1960s, divergences in inflation rates and external balances began to 
appear among member states of the European Community. A speculative attack against 
the French franc in favor of the deutsche mark in May 1968 put a great deal of pressure 
on the bilateral parities of Community currencies. At the same time, policy circles 
started to discuss the necessity to coordinate economic and monetary policies among the 
member states and establish monetary facilities for mutual balance of payments 
assistance. The Werner Plan was completed in 1970 and endorsed by the Council of 
Ministers in 1971. The Plan had recommended the rapid adoption of a common 
currency. Three stages were envisioned, including the pooling of foreign exchange 
reserves for joint intervention. However, the Plan was immediately abandoned, because 
it was deemed wholly unrealistic.  
 The main practical outcome was a new system (the ‘Snake’) for limiting 
fluctuations in exchange rates between EC currencies. But, with the collapse of the 
Bretton Woods system, EC member countries merely sought to solve its own problems 
without regarding Europe as a single entity. The economic policy of each country was 
made at the national level: the British government soon removed the pound from the 
Snake, and other EC governments (the French twice) followed this lead, creating an 
unsustainable climate in which further progress towards a monetary union was 
impossible.  
 The nine EC member countries were divided into two groups with very different 
economic performance and exchange rate regimes by 1977.1 One group had achieved 
some success in keeping inflation moderate and had maintained the outward appearance 
of having the intention of participating in the Snake System. Germany, Benelux 
countries and Denmark, with Norway as an associate member belonged to this first 
Group. The other group floated their currencies individually and all experienced high 
inflation, current account deficits and substantial depreciation. The currencies in the 
second group were the pound sterling, the French franc, the Italian lira and the Irish 
punt. It seemed difficult to devise an exchange rate system which comprised both 
groups of countries. 
 On the trade integration front, internal trade liberalization also slowed during the 
                                                          
1 On January 22, 1972, after difficult negotiations, the United Kingdom, along with Ireland, Denmark, 
and Norway, signed the Treaty of Accession with the European Community. In a subsequent referendum, 
the Norwegian electorate rejected membership. 
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1970s, as the elimination of tariffs and quotas exposed the protective effect of numerous, 
seemingly immutable, behind-the-border barriers. The only important milestone toward 
European integration during the 1970s was the creation, in 1979, of the European 
Monetary System (EMS), with its companions, the European currency unit (ECU) and 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). The three existing credit facilities – the very 
short-term financing facility (VSTF), the short-term monetary support facility (STMS), 
and the medium-term financial assistance facility (MTFA) – were also extended in the 
EMS. The EMS was able to bring together European countries to cooperate again in the 
monetary sphere and became the focus of the monetary cooperation policy. The EMS 
enjoyed stability without realignments and additional participants in the second half of 
the 1980s. 
 As late as 1988, the idea of a monetary union resurfaced. The Hannover European 
Council of June 1988 set up a Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary 
Union in the European Community, presided over by the president of the EC 
Commission, Jacques Delors. In April 1989, the so-called Delors Committee published 
its Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community, proposing a 
three-stage process to economic and monetary union (EMU). It stressed the need for 
greater coordination of economic policies, rules on the size and financing of national 
budget deficits, and a new, completely independent institution which would be 
responsible for the Union’s monetary policy. However, this proposal was met with the 
same skepticism that was encountered by the earlier Werner Plan. It took an exceptional 
event, the collapse of the Berlin Wall, to trigger a serious reassessment that no political 
leader could have predicted only a few weeks earlier (Schweickert, 2002; Wyplosz, 
2001). 
 The EMU negotiations were concluded at the European Council in Maastricht on 
9-10 December 1991. The Maastricht Treaty provides for economic and monetary union 
to be introduced by the end of the century in three successive stages. The negotiations 
concerning the transitional phase proved particularly difficult.2 The European Monetary 
Institute (EMI), established in January 1994, as a precursor to the European Central 
Bank, played an important role in facilitating and reinforcing coordination of national 
monetary policies during the transition. The Stability and Growth Pact also clarified the 
                                                          
2 Immediately after the crisis, fears were widespread that the Maastricht process was doomed 
(Eichengreen and Frieddon, 2001). This pessimism turned out to be exaggerated. First, even governments 
that had been forced to devalue reiterated their commitment to the completion of the monetary union and 
were able to keep their currencies close to their central rates. Second, economic developments became 
more favorable because German unification effects became weaker. Finally, the Growth and Stability 
Pact was added for dealing with “excessive deficits” (Schweickert, 2002). 
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Maastricht Treaty’s provision for dealing with “excessive deficits” and provided an 
institutional framework for its enforcement, in part through strengthened surveillance 
and coordination of economic policies.  
 Europe’s experience suggests that exchange rate stability was, in fact, the lynchpin 
of efforts to strengthen trade integration.  Whenever there was some doubt about 
exchange rate stability, trade integration also becomes sluggish.  In this sense, a certain 
form of monetary integration is a prerequisite for successful trade integration.  
 
 
3. Is There Any Difference in East Asia? 
 
Unlike in Europe, historically there has been much less active movement towards 
regionalism in East Asia. Besides the political diversity in East Asia, most East Asian 
countries have been more reliant on the U.S. and EU markets, so there has been less 
incentive for them to expand trade integration within the region. In fact, the first major 
attempt was made only in 1992 when 6 ASEAN countries agreed to launch a scheme for 
ASEAN free trade.3 Thereafter, the ASEAN free trade area has continued to extend so 
that it now includes the whole area of Southeast Asia.  
 Recently, China has become more active in cooperating with the ASEAN 
countries towards a free trade agreement. In November 2001, China committed to 
negotiating a free trade agreement with ASEAN. Japan also formed a joint study group 
with ASEAN to find the feasibility of Japan-ASEAN FTA. However, a region-wide 
East Asian FTA, covering ASEAN+3 countries, would be slow to materialize because 
China and Japan are seeking formal trade arrangements bilaterally rather than 
multilaterally. The current pattern of regional trade agreements in East Asia is also 
bewildering (Scollay and Gilbert, 2001), essentially consisting of a web of bilateral 
arrangements, many of which are still on the drawing board. There has apparently been 
no formal attempt at building a regional multilateral agreement similar to the Common 
Market. Bilateral negotiation is unlikely to foster a collective framework (Wyplosz, 
2002).4 
 Furthermore, for Korea and Japan, the most difficult problem in reaching a free 
trade agreement with other Asian countries is the agricultural sector. In fact, any trade 
agreement, because of its differential effects on various sectors, faces the possibility of 
                                                          
3 The six countries are Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei.  
4 On the monetary front, the preference towards regional exchange rate arrangements become less strong 
in East Asia because of the absence of multilateral trading arrangement at the regional level. 
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severe resistance from domestic vested interest groups. Korea and Japan have been 
heavily subsidizing their agricultural sectors, and there are still mounting concerns that 
opening this sector, although beneficial for the economy as a whole, will ruin those who 
rely on it for their livelihood. Since many people in Korea and Japan have family roots 
in the agricultural region, and in many cases maintain close ties with relatives in the 
rural areas, any policy that inflicts heavy losses on the agricultural sector will be 
politically unpopular. Unlike the free trade agreement, financial and monetary 
cooperation among East Asian countries may meet with less political resistance due to 
its more neutral consequences.  
 Since the currency crisis, East Asian countries have come to realize that they need 
some arrangements for policy coordination and monetary arrangements to stabilize the 
exchange rates of regional currencies. While Japan’s attempt to establish a so-called 
Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) was not successful, the more recent agreement of the 
Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) indicates that ASEAN+3 can concur on substantial 
arrangements towards financial integration in the region. In this context, it is no wonder 
that the creation of a regional monetary system or monetary union in East Asia similar 
to the type adopted in Europe has been recently proposed and discussed in academic 
circles and even policy-making groups. 
 The background of attempts to introduce a monetary union in East Asia seems to 
have multifaceted aspects. Firstly, many East Asian developing countries are still 
searching for an optimal exchange rate regime. After the Asian currency crisis, most 
East Asian developing countries abandoned their fixed exchange rate regimes and 
nominally adopted free-floating regimes (in many cases, with a policy focus on inflation 
targeting). However, it is no exaggeration to say that there still exists a “fear of floating” 
among many monetary authorities (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002).  This makes it difficult 
for many Asian countries to take advantage of the benefits of the floating exchange rate 
system, such as the autonomy of monetary policy. Of course, there is no point returning 
to the previous case of the de facto fixed exchange rate regime which might be 
vulnerable to another currency crisis. Nevertheless, the regional monetary grouping 
could be an alternative to both fixed and flexible rate regimes at the national level. 
 Secondly, a monetary union in East Asia may be necessary to avoid competitive 
devaluation of regional currencies. For many East Asian developing countries with 
common export markets, the fluctuation of their exchange rates against the yen could 
critically affect the competitiveness of their exports. In fact, it was a depreciation of the 
yen against the dollar that resulted in the current account deficit for these countries in 
the mid-1990s, which might have been closely related to the subsequent currency crisis 
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in the region. Kwan (2001) points out that the pro-cyclical aspect of capital flows in and 
out of East Asia is closely related to the instability of the yen-dollar rate. Although the 
stability of the G-3 currencies (dollar, euro and yen) is highly beneficial to small open 
emerging market economies, the political will for a project of G-3 currency stability 
through cooperative schemes is hard to spot, particularly in the United States. 
Consequently, a regional response seems to be a plausible second best. 
 Thirdly, the stabilization of exchange rates will help East Asian countries achieve 
their full potential for growth and development.  Most Asian countries have relied on 
exports as a key to their rapid growth.  Stabilized exchange rates, hence reduce 
exchange risks, encourage firms in the export sector and make it easier for Asian banks 
and corporations to borrow abroad. By forming a monetary union, East Asian countries 
can expect their common currency to remain stable against outside currencies as well as 
their own currencies to stay stable against each other. 
 Given this backdrop, the Asian currency crisis in 1997 and the launch of the euro 
in 1999 made the possibility and desirability of introducing a more highly sophisticated 
form of economic integration such as a regional monetary union in East Asia a point of 
debate.5 However, it has often been argued that East Asia is less self-contained than 
Europe. Many East Asian countries rely as heavily on the U.S. and Europe for export 
markets as they do on other Asian countries, including Japan (Eichengreen, 2002; 
Kawai, 2001; Ogawa and Ito, 2000). In Europe, it was of utmost importance to defend 
regional parities given the high degree of regional trade interdependence. On the other 
hand, despite increasing intra-regional trade dependence in East Asia, a plan to stabilize 
exchange rates vis-à-vis a basket of major international currencies rather than intra-
regional exchange rates has been proposed (Kawai, 2001; Ogawa and Ito, 2000; 
Williamson, 1999). In Section 4, we will consider whether East Asian countries are 
ready to adopt a common currency in terms of optimum currency area (OCA) criteria.  
 Another important issue is to analyze the advantages of introducing monetary 
integration ahead of trade integration. While Europe started with trade integration, some 
observers note that East Asia is attempting to start monetary cooperation before 
successfully completing a regional multilateral trade agreement (Bergsten 2000; Bird 
and Rajan 2001; Dieter 2001). Since trade agreements among East Asian countries are 
slow to materialize and tangled in a complex web of bilateral agreements, monetary 
regionalism might be an alternative route to regional integration in East Asia.  
                                                          
5 There are various forms of abolishing exchange rates all together, including dollarization, currency 
boards, and currency union (or regional monetary arrangement). In this paper, only the form of a regional 
currency union will be considered. 
-  - 8 
 
 
4. Does East Asia Satisfy Optimum Currency Area Criteria? 
 
The seminal paper written by Robert Mundell (1961) was the point of departure for the 
huge volume of literature on the topic of optimum currency areas.  Mundell observed 
that an exchange rate adjustment which permitted the pursuit of independent monetary 
policies in two countries (say, the USA and Canada) was of little use if the disturbance 
depressed one region within both countries (say, western Canada and the western USA) 
while simultaneously boosting other regions within both (say, eastern Canada and the 
eastern USA). In this case, there could be an efficiency argument for forming one 
currency area comprised of the two western parts and another currency area made up of 
the eastern parts. In response to this disturbance, the western regions can then adopt one 
policy, the eastern regions another, and the exchange rate between them can adjust 
accordingly, while the advantages of a common currency are preserved in the form of 
reduced exchange rate risk and lower transaction costs within the eastern and western 
regions. In Mundell’s framework, the incidence of disturbances across regions is a 
critical determinant in the design of currency areas (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 1993, p. 
195). 
 Subsequent literature explored the determinants of the incidence of shocks 
(McKinnon 1963; Kenen 1969). Most of the literature considers four criteria for 
forming a monetary union – interdependence through trade, symmetry of shocks, 
mobility of factors of production, and convergence of macroeconomic policies. First, 
countries that are highly integrated in terms of international trade stand to benefit more 
by forming an OCA since a common currency will result in greater savings on 
transaction costs and reduce the risks associated with using different currencies. 
Therefore trade interdependence is a very important condition for forming an OCA.  
 The second criterion for an OCA points to the possibility that countries with 
symmetric business cycles are more likely to be members of an OCA.  As shown above 
in Mundell’s intuitive explanation, regions with symmetric shocks can take the same 
monetary policy against other regions receiving different shocks.  Since adopting a 
monetary union implies the abandonment of autonomous monetary policies, the costs of 
forming a monetary union with regions of asymmetric shocks will be tremendous.  
Kenen (1969) also highlighted the degree of industry or product diversification as a 
determinant of the symmetry of shocks. When two regions are highly specialized in the 
production of distinct goods, their prices are affected very differently by disturbances. 
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By contrast, when the two regions have the same industrial structure and produce the 
same goods, disturbances are more likely symmetric.   
 Third, if mobility of labor and capital is permitted, the local shock could be 
resolved without incurring great adjustment costs. Therefore, countries that want to join 
the monetary union have to permit factor mobility more freely. However, Mundell 
(1961) believed that labor mobility was not the most important condition for an OCA. 
Even if labor mobility were not perfectly possible, a country could gain various benefits 
by participating in an OCA. McKinnon (1963) also insisted that the currency 
arrangements themselves would affect factor mobility, so the extent of factor mobility 
had to be considered ex post facto.  
 Finally, when countries within the region have different policy targets, their 
interests are intensely conflicting with respect to the same external shock so that a 
coordination system for exchange rate stability could easily collapse (Dixit, 2001).6 In 
Europe, a high degree of convergence of macroeconomic policies among the member 
countries in the EMU was required to push forward the implementation of a single 
monetary policy.7 A set of policy parameters was closely watched to ensure that policy 
actions were coordinated effectively.  
    Among the four criteria, the issue of asymmetric responses to external shocks has 
been the focal point of the empirical analysis of the OCA criteria. Most analyses have 
focused on whether countries participating in a monetary union reacted symmetrically 
in terms of shocks. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994), based on a breakdown of shocks 
between demand and supply shocks a la Blanchard and Quah (1989), find that there is 
little difference in the asymmetry of both shocks between Europe and East Asia. 
Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999), using the OCA index developed in Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1996), find that the economies of East Asia are more or less as plausible 
candidates for a monetary union as the members of the EU.  Bayoumi and Mauro 
(1999) also find that, while East Asian countries are less suited for a regional currency 
arrangement than Europe, the difference is not large.  
 More recently, Baek and Song (2002) and Lee, Park and Shin (2002) also confirm 
that East Asia is as plausible a candidate for a common currency area as the Euro area.  
Especially, Lee, Park and Shin (2002) improve the methodology of assessing the 
                                                          
6 Dixit (2001) raised the issue of the robustness and sustainability of the EMU’s institutional 
arrangements by constructing various models when member countries have different policy objectives. 
Hughes Hallett and Weymark (2002) also stress the potential tensions among union members that might 
threaten the stability of the union. The types of policy heterogeneity include differences in national 
preferences for price stability, output growth, and income distribution. 
7 All EU members were allowed to participate in the transition process to the EMU, but they had to meet 
all the convergence criteria stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty. 
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symmetry of shocks by considering a model in which the output of an economy is 
influenced by three different shocks - global, regional, and country-specific. The 
importance of a common regional shock is interpreted to provide a case for a common 
regional currency.  They find that the size of regional shocks is comparable to that of 
Europe, which is interpreted as an indication that East Asia is well suited for a monetary 
union.  
 On the other hand, Wyplosz (2001) and Chow and Kim (2000) have a less positive 
view on whether East Asia satisfies the preconditions for implementing a monetary 
union.  Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) also argue that East Asia lacks important 
institutions for implementing a monetary union, such as sound financial systems, 
political network, and a long integrationist tradition.  We will discuss this issue in more 
detail in Section 5.   
 
 
5. Introducing a Monetary Union ahead of FTA 
 
In this section we will discuss issues related to the reversal of sequence between an FTA 
and a monetary union.  We organize this section into five subsections.  The first four 
subsections generally discuss the advantages of introducing a monetary union ahead of 
forming an FTA. The last subsection does not point to a disadvantage, but explains the 
difficulty of introducing a monetary union in general. 
 
Monetary Union and Trade 
 
In the previous section, we find that most studies on this topic agree that the costs of a 
monetary union in East Asia are not as high as they were for Europe. However, the fact 
that most East Asian countries are more dependent on the U.S. and EU markets as 
outlets for their exports suggests that the potential benefits from a monetary union might 
also not be as large as they are for Europe (larger intra-regional trade implies larger 
benefits). Table 1 shows the pattern of the changes in the importance of intra-regional 
trade for East Asia and Europe. In the table, intra-regional trade is measured by the 
share of an economy’s total trade with the rest of the economies that belong to the same 
region in its total trade. While the gap has narrowed in recent decades, intra-regional 
trade in Europe (64.4 in 1980 and 66.4 in 2000) is much higher than in East Asia (51.3 
in 2000). 
 If East Asia were to follow the same strategy as Europe, then it would need to 
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foster further trade integration until the benefits of a monetary union become high 
enough. In fact, intra-regional trade in East Asia has also increased from 41.9 in 1980 to 
51.3 in 2000. If this trend continues, eventually the level of intra-regional trade in East 
Asia could reach the same degree of internal trade in Europe at the time of the euro’s 
introduction. Since the East Asian market, especially that of China, is rapidly expanding, 
East Asia can be as self-contained as Europe in the future. However, considering the 
speed of increase in intra-regional trade in the past 20 years, for East Asian countries to 
reach the current level of Europe, it may take another 20 years. In particular, given the 
current low level of intra-regional trade in Japan (38.1) and Korea (42.2), far below the 
average (51.3), the region’s two major trading countries need to play a more active role 
in promoting intra-regional trade. 
 However, one advantage of immediately introducing a monetary union is that it 
may speed up intra-regional trade integration significantly without any additional efforts 
such as forming a free trade agreement. Rose (2000) estimates the degree to which trade 
is affected when exchange rate variability is eliminated through a monetary union. 
Using data for a large number of countries during the 1970-1990 period, he finds that 
bilateral trade is higher for a pair of countries that use the same currency than for two 
countries using their own currencies. More precisely, the coefficient on a monetary 
union dummy in an empirical model of bilateral trade is found to be positive and 
significant in both economic and statistical terms. The value of the coefficient suggests 
that membership in a currency union, ceteris paribus, more than triples bilateral trade.8 
This is true even after controlling for a number of other factors that might affect trade 
through the gravity model, which shows that trade between a pair of countries is 
proportional to their combined incomes, and inversely proportional to the distance 
between them. More importantly, a free trade agreement is also one of the controlled 
factors in his analysis. 
 Whether Rose’s findings are directly applicable to East Asia or not is an 
interesting question. Can a monetary union in East Asia provide the important 
advantage of bypassing the difficult political procedures of free trade agreements? 
However, there must be some caveats in interpreting Rose’s estimate. His empirical 
findings are based on cross section data and, in most cases, countries in monetary 
                                                          
8 Rose (2000) emphasizes a phenomenon known as “home bias” in international trade – much more 
intense trade inside countries than between countries. He points out that sharing a common currency is a 
much more serious and durable commitment than a fixed rate among countries. McCallum (1995) 
quantifies the size of the intra-regional bias at more than twenty to one, finding that trade between two 
Canadian provinces is more than 20 times larger than trade between a comparable Canadian 
province/American state pair. Rose seems to regard this home bias effect as one of the main driving 
forces for increasing trade through monetary union. 
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unions are small in size. Hence at least two things are not clear; (i) how long it will take 
for a country to triple its trade with other member countries if it joins a monetary union 
and (ii) whether the estimate is also applicable to a large country in East Asia. Since 
increasing trade three-fold is not easy to accomplish, many people have questioned 
Rose’s estimate.9  
 Glick and Rose (2001) respond to the criticism by estimating the effect of 
monetary union on trade using a time series variation. They use a data set covering a 
large number of countries for fifty post-war years. During this sample period, a large 
number of monetary unions dissolved, providing both time series and cross-sectional 
variations on the incidence of monetary unions. Specifically, over one hundred country-
pairs dissolved common currency linkages during the sample period. By comparing the 
trade of these countries before and after this regime change, they estimate the effect of 
monetary union membership on trade. Their empirical results also confirm those of 
Rose (2000). They find an economically and statistically significant effect of monetary 
union on trade using a number of different panel estimation techniques. Their estimate 
is that bilateral trade rises/falls by about 100% as a pair of countries forms/dissolves a 
monetary union, with other conditions unchanged. 
 While the time series evidence of a monetary union’s effects on trade is smaller 
than that of cross section evidence, it is still large at 100%. Frankel and Rose (2002) go 
one step further to estimate the effects of monetary union via trade on output using a 
two-stage approach. In the first stage, the results show that a monetary union leads to a 
three-fold increase in trade. Moreover, there is no evidence of trade diversion. In the 
second stage, their estimates suggest that every 1% increase in trade (relative to GDP) 
raises per capita income by roughly 1/3 of a percent over 20 years.10 These empirical 
results support the hypothesis that the beneficial effects of a monetary union on 
economic performance are garnered through the promotion of trade rather than through 
a commitment to a non-inflationary monetary policy or other macroeconomic influences. 
 
 
Monetary Union and Business Cycle Co-movement 
                                                          
9 Rose’s estimate seems to be especially large given that, in the literature, estimates of the effect of 
reduced exchange rate volatility on trade are small. See Alesina, Barro and Tenreyro (2002) for a 
technical discussion on empirical problems, such as aggregation bias, omitted variable regression, self-
selection, sample selection and so on. 
10 As the deadweight losses of using different currencies vanish, competitive pressures increase and 
consumers gain static ‘Harberger’ triangles. The size of these gains may be large. Frankel and Romer 
(1999) estimate that increasing the ratio of trade to GDP by one percentage point raises per capita income 
by between one-half and two percent. 
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Generally, when a number of countries adopt a common currency, each of the countries 
must yield its independent monetary policy to a supranational authority. When 
asymmetric macroeconomic shocks occur across member countries, they are no longer 
able to use the monetary policy to respond. This may be considered a potential cost of 
monetary union according to the classical theory of the optimum currency area. 
However, the monetary policy itself could be a shock that leads to macroeconomic 
instability. A monetary union can prevent asymmetric monetary shocks through a single 
monetary policy.  
 The fact that a monetary union leads to a significant increase in trade among 
member countries also suggests another important implication for adopting a common 
currency. Countries with highly positively correlated business cycles are more likely to 
join a monetary union, other things equal.  However, because business cycle correlation 
is closely related to trade intensity among countries, by affecting trade intensity among 
member countries, a monetary union can also alter the costs of sacrificing independent 
monetary policy ex post facto. This is what Frankel and Rose (1998) emphasized as the 
endogenous nature of a decision to join a monetary union. In other words, a naïve 
examination of historical data may give a misleading picture of a country’s eligibility 
for entry into a monetary union since the economic structure is likely to change 
dramatically as a result of a monetary union.11  
 To see whether a monetary union increases or decreases the costs of joining one ex 
post facto, the key is to verify how increased trade affects business cycle co-movement. 
From a theoretical point of view, the effects of trade integration can lead to business 
cycle synchronization in either direction – convergence or divergence. Eichengreen 
(1992), Kenen (1969) and Krugman (1993) argued that as trade linkages increased, 
greater specialization of production would occur, resulting in less synchronization of 
business cycles. In particular, this is more so if business cycles are dominated by 
industry-specific technological shocks. 
 Frankel and Rose (1998) countered Krugman’s argument, insisting that when 
demand shocks were dominant and intra-industry trade was more persuasive than inter-
industry trade between the countries adopting the single currency, business cycles 
                                                          
11 Most previous studies focus on the empirical question of whether or not a monetary union leads to 
structural changes in economic fundamentals, which favor business cycle synchronization. Recently, 
Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) offer a distinct argument for endogenous optimal currency areas, with 
conceptual roots in the Lucas critique. They show that the adoption of a common monetary policy can be 
self-validating, independent of economic integration. Their assertion is rather compelling. With 
incomplete exchange rate pass-through, the optimal monetary policy is to respond symmetrically to 
shocks anywhere in the region. 
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would become more positively correlated as trade becomes more integrated. In the 
literature, there are at least two additional important linkages between business cycle 
co-movements and increased trade. First, if demand shocks drive a boom in one country, 
the effects can spill over to trading partners through an increased volume of imports. 
Second, increased trade may create a greater need for more coordinated fiscal as well as 
monetary policies, which synchronize policy shocks. Both of these linkages imply that 
increased trade leads to tighter business cycle co-movements. 
 In sum, the theoretical implications of more trade integration on business cycle co-
movements are not clear; to test the validity of the theories, an empirical investigation is 
in order. Canova and Dellas (1993) investigated this issue and found that there was 
some evidence of trade affecting the transmission of disturbances across countries but it 
was not robust to the choice of de-trending method. Frankel and Rose (1998) found 
more positive results. Based on 21 industrialized countries, they found that the more 
countries trade with each other, the more highly correlated are their business cycles. 
That is, there is a strong positive relationship between the degree of bilateral trade 
intensity and the cross-country bilateral correlation of outputs.   
 These results can be interpreted to assure an early introduction of a monetary 
union; it will also decrease the costs of adopting a monetary union by lowering 
asymmetric shocks through increased trade. Even a country that is not suited ex ante to 
joining a monetary union can be justified ex post facto in joining one due to lowered 
asymmetrical shocks. However, an important step is missing in Frankel and Rose’s 
analysis. Frankel and Rose (1998) conjectured that their results are due to intra-industry 
trade, but did not try to identify the channel through which increased trade affects 
business cycle co-movements.   
 Recently, Fidrmuc (2001) has shown that, based on a cross section of OECD 
countries between 1990 and 1999, convergence of business cycles relates to intra-
industry trade, but there is no direct relation between business cycles and bilateral trade 
intensity. Loayza, Lopez and Ubide (2001) analyze the East Asian countries as a region 
which shows significant short-run and long-run co-movement of business cycles. They 
find that this co-movement is based on the countries’ highly similar trade structures. 
Shin and Wang (2002) also find that intra-industry trade is the major channel by which 
the business cycle of Korea becomes synchronized with that of 11 other Asian 
economies, although increased trade itself does not necessarily lead to close business 
cycle coherence. These recent empirical analyses suggest that business cycle co-
movements are strengthened only when the increased trade is accompanied by more 
intra-industry trade. While a monetary union may increase trade afterwards, if mainly 
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inter-industry trade occurs, business cycle co-movements can be weakened and the 
monetary union become undesirable ex post facto. 
 Table 2 shows the trends in intra-industry trade for East Asian and European 
countries. We calculated an index of intra-industry trade intensity à la Grubel and Lloyd 
(1975). In constructing the measure, an important consideration is to decide how 
detailed a classification of industries is used. Rather than a priori determining a proper 
industry classification, we construct three measures based on two (IIT-2), three (IIT-3) 
and four (IIT-4) digit industry classifications following the International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC).12 For each country, we report the average intra-industry 
index for the trade with other countries in the same regions, using the trade volume as 
weights. 
 Most empirical studies widely confirm the hypothesis that measures of intra-
industry trade relative to inter-industry trade decline steeply as the distance between the 
trading partners increases.13  In light of this finding, the intra-industry trade among 
geographically neighboring East Asian countries should be high. However, the intra-
industry trade index in East Asia was much lower than that of Europe in 1980: 31.3 vs. 
60.8 for IIT-2, 22.6 vs. 52.0 for IIT-3 and 20.0 vs. 46.6 for IIT-4. This reflects that, in 
1980, European countries, compared to East Asian countries, had more homogeneous 
industry structures.14 The index is monotonically increasing in both regions, but the 
speed is much faster in East Asia, so that the gap becomes much smaller in 1999: 56.1 
vs. 67.9 for IIT-2, 51.1 vs. 58.9 for IIT-3 and 45.0 vs. 52.3 for IIT-4.  This is good news 
for a monetary union because trade in East Asia not only increases but also occurs more 
and more within the same industries. If this tendency continues, then business cycle co-
movement can be strengthened. 
 When we examine individual countries, this index is low in China, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea and Thailand – below the average in the region. Furthermore, the index is 
increasing in most East Asian countries except for Hong Kong, China and Korea. If this 
trend continues for these countries, then they are likely to have more asymmetric shocks 
                                                          
12 Industry-level trade data are available in Nicita and Olarreaga (2001), which reorganize the United 
Nations Statistics Department’s Comtrade database through the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade 
Solution (WITS) software. The industry disaggregation in the database follows the International Standard 
Industrial Classification (ISIC) and is provided at the 2 digit level (9 industries), the 3 digit level (28 
industries) and at the 4 digit level (81 industries) manufacturing industries only. 
13 See for example, Balassa (1986a, 1986b), Balassa and Bauwens (1987, 1988), Bergstrand (1983), 
Culem and Lundberg (1986), Hummels and Levinsohn (1995), Loertscher and Wolter (1980), and Stone 
and Lee (1995). 
14 Rice, Stewart, and Venables (2002), by using the data of 22 OECD countries, find that closer countries 
tend to have more similar structures of underlying export supply and import demand, and as a 
consequence, intra-industry trade tends to be relatively high between close (and hence similar) countries.  
-  - 16
over the business cycle, which may prevent them from joining a monetary union. 
However, it is very difficult to predict how this trend will change in individual countries 
without analyzing what factors contribute to fostering inter- or intra-industry trade. This 
will be a good subject for future research.   
 
 
Preventing Currency Crises and Saving Foreign Reserves 
 
In Rose’s sample (2000), the 284 pairs of a monetary union with positive amounts of 
bilateral trade are divided into 108 cases of country pairs that are also members of a 
formal free trade agreement (FTA) and 176 country pairs that are not (Melitz, 2001). 
Since monetary unions may exaggerate exceptionally close trade ties through a formal 
FTA, it is necessary to control the effect of FTAs on trade to correct the bias. In Rose 
(2000), countries that use the same currencies tend to trade disproportionately, even 
holding the various factors constant (including FTAs). A monetary union is expected to 
increase trade, thereby promoting welfare. But, unlike FTAs, a monetary union goes 
beyond anticipated welfare gains from larger trade. In this subsection, we will discuss 
additional benefits from a monetary union. 
 It is clear form the experience of the East Asian crisis that an FTA is not helpful in 
preventing or mitigating a financial crisis. While Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand are all members of the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA), AFTA did not 
play any role in rescuing those countries. A more vivid example can be found in the 
Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) which is composed of Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay. Since its creation, MERCOSUR has gone from a free trade area 
to an imperfect customs union, adopting economic obligations in common. In the area 
of macroeconomic coordination, it has established formal targets for fiscal deficits, 
foreign public debt and inflation. However, those macroeconomic targets were not 
achieved because there were no strong incentives to do so in the absence of monetary 
integration. 
 By contrast, a monetary union implies a more durable political commitment on the 
macroeconomic policy front. During the transition period, sound macroeconomic 
preconditions must be fulfilled. Once a common monetary policy is implemented, more 
comprehensive monitoring and surveillance activities over member economies are put 
in place for maintaining the stability of the system. Concerted and coordinated 
macroeconomic policies are essential. To the extent that a lack of internal disciplines for 
monetary policy tends to persist, such countries would benefit the most from the 
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introduction of an external discipline from a monetary union (Alesina, Barro and 
Tenreyro, 2002). 
 In addition, monetary union is a scheme for reducing foreign currency reserves at 
the national level. Now East Asian countries are accumulating a huge amount of foreign 
reserves to prevent future crises. As shown in table 3, foreign exchange reserves held by 
East Asian economies in 2001 total as much as US$1 trillion. Japan's reserve assets 
totaled US$388 billion as of  the end of December 2001. China, together with Hong 
Kong, has reserves of US$333 billion. The current level of foreign reserves in East Asia 
is clearly excessive compared to the optimal level. This is clear when we compare this 
amount to the foreign reserves held by the monetary union in Europe, which is about 
one sixth of those held in East Asia. If the foreign reserves in East Asian countries were 
pooled through a central bank of a monetary union, each country would greatly benefit 
from it.  
 
 
Capital Market Integration 
 
While a free trade agreement is not a precondition for a monetary union, a monetary 
union usually presupposes that capital is freely mobile across member countries. East 
Asian countries have been rapidly deregulating and opening up their capital markets 
since the 1990s. Hence completely opening capital markets among East Asian countries 
with the introduction of a currency union will not be a difficult task to accomplish. As 
pointed out in Lee, Park and Shin (2002), however, East Asian capital markets are more 
closely tied to the global financial centers such as the U.S. and the U.K. and there is no 
clear evidence that the capital markets of the East Asian countries are more regionally 
integrated. This fact hints that large benefits may not result from further financial 
integration in the region through a monetary union. 
 Lee, Park and Shin (2002) explain why financial integration is taking place at the 
global level, not at the regional level. First, unlike home bias at the country level, there 
are not many reasons for home bias to occur at the regional level. For example, hedging 
is not especially easier by holding a regional portfolio. Information superiority at the 
regional level does not seem to be enormously more advantageous than at the global 
level. Second, the institutional and structural characteristics of East Asian economies, 
particularly in the financial systems are likely to limit the extent of regional financial 
integration in the future. Especially underdevelopment of financial systems that are 
largely bank-oriented leave corporations and financial institutions in the region heavily 
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dependent on Western securities firms, investment banks, insurance companies, and 
other non-bank financial institutions. Further the rapid development in information and 
communication technology enables local branches of western financial institutions to be 
well connected to the centers at low costs. Third, the savings and investment profile is 
not well matched within the region. Since the outbreak of the crisis in 1997, all of the 
East Asian crisis countries have become net lenders and are likely to continue being so. 
Hence the East Asian countries must rely on other areas as outlets for their net savings.  
 However, there is a possibility that introducing a monetary union can accelerate 
the financial integration in East Asia.  As pointed out in the case of trade, a monetary 
union can endogenously change the nature of financial cooperation among member 
countries. For example, a monetary union can eliminate the necessity of using a foreign 
currency – particularly the U.S. dollar – for both trade in goods and financial 
transactions among member countries, leaving fewer opportunities for foreign financial 
institutions to step in. The absence of exchange risk among member countries can also 
facilitate investment in their financial assets.   
 Free capital mobility was not allowed until the last stage of currency unification in 
Europe. This is because, as explained in Wyplosz (2001), the conflict between exchange 
rate stability and the active use of monetary policy was reconciled through internal and 
external financial repression. In particular, external financial repression took the form of 
capital controls so that arbitrage relative to the world interest rate could be prevented. 
Therefore, while Europe has been quite fast at deepening its internal trade, it has been 
notoriously slow at liberalizing its financial markets, both internally and externally. As 
Europe has liberalized its capital accounts, such a formal coordinated (fixed but 
adjustable) exchange rate mechanism was greatly endangered by volatile capital 
movements. When capital controls were lifted, monetary union was preferred to 
maintaining national monetary policies.   
 
 
Political Aspects of a Monetary Union 
 
One of the most important hindrances to introducing a monetary union in East Asia is 
related not to economic factors but to political factors. According to Eichengreen and 
Bayoumi (1999), the debate over monetary integration in Western Europe has been 
closely related to discussions of political integration and the creation of a supranational 
entity empowered to override previously sovereign national governments. While Europe 
has a long history of movement towards integration, Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) 
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point out that there has been resistance to the creation of a supranational authority and 
the construction of institutional restraints on national policy every step of the way. 
 In this regard, East Asia has much weaker precedents of movement towards 
political integration. For sure, this will act as a major obstacle to the creation of a 
monetary union. Traditionally, East Asian countries have put much emphasis on their 
national sovereignty. Given that a national currency is an important symbol of 
sovereignty, relinquishing it can be interpreted as an act of humiliation to East Asian 
people.   
 Unlike trade integration, however, the nature of political objection is more or less 
emotional and not based on differential economic consequences of a monetary union to 
different sectors of the economy.  In this sense, economic conflicts among members of a 
monetary union can be less severe.  This different nature of economic conflicts in 
forming monetary union suggests that political resolution can be rather easier in some 
sense. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Regionalism is taking two forms. It is occurring firstly through free trade arrangements 
and secondly through monetary arrangements. These trade and monetary integration 
processes imply that geographically proximate countries hang together to foster trade on 
the one hand and to manage intra-regional exchange rate stability on the other. These 
two processes interactively reinforce each other.  
 In this paper, we highlight the issues related to the reversal of sequence between 
trade integration (free trade agreement) and monetary integration (a monetary union). 
While the Euro area pursued trade integration first, from a theoretical point of view, 
there is no clear reason for introducing trade integration ahead of monetary integration. 
In fact, even in Europe, trade integration slowed down whenever there were concerns 
about exchange rate stability among member countries. In this regard, an important pre-
condition for trade integration is a certain form of monetary cooperation. 
 We believe that there are many good reasons for forming a monetary union before 
a free trade agreement. For example, a monetary union can increase trade among 
member countries quite significantly by serving as a device to avoid a bottleneck that 
can be encountered during the process of a free trade agreement. Given that this 
increased trade is likely to occur mostly within the similar industries, weakening 
asymmetric shocks across member countries will also decrease the costs of maintaining 
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a monetary union. Further a monetary union can also accelerate financial integration in 
the region, which might not be accomplished otherwise.  Hence, a monetary union is a 
self-validating process.  
 A major hindrance to a monetary union in East Asia, however, is the lack of 
historical experience in regionalism in the region. Whatever economic benefits a 
monetary union brings, however, it is unlikely to be realized in the near future if each 
country is unwilling to cooperate in the political avenue.  
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Table 1. Trends of Intra-region Trade in East Asia and Europe 
 
 
Intra-region Trade 
(percentage of total trade) 
 1980 1990 2000 
East Asia    
China 42.4 58.9 48.7 
Hong Kong 46.7 60.4 64.1 
Indonesia 62.6 56.8 54.4 
Japan 23.8 28.0 38.1 
Korea 32.7 34.2 42.2 
Malaysia 49.2 55.1 56.1 
Philippines 37.4 40.0 46.5 
Singapore 49.4 50.7 57.5 
Taiwan 34.9 43.1 50.9 
Thailand 40.1 47.5 54.2 
Average 41.9 47.5 51.3 
    
Europe    
Austria 69.8 75.6 71.0 
Belgium 74.9 80.4 72.5 
Denmark 74.4 75.5 74.8 
Finland 57.4 66.6 61.7 
France 57.8 67.1 66.7 
Germany 63.9 67.4 59.1 
Greece 48.2 70.1 56.1 
Ireland 77.6 76.1 61.3 
Italy 56.1 67.3 59.1 
Netherlands 70.5 77.0 67.3 
Norway 78.6 75.2 73.7 
Portugal 58.7 78.5 78.6 
Spain 43.2 68.2 67.8 
Sweden 73.8 78.9 68.4 
Switzerland 69.0 72.1 66.9 
United Kingdom 55.8 62.8 57.0 
Average 64.4 72.4 66.4 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Note: this table is Table 4 in Lee, Park and shin (2202).  Intra-region trade is measured by the 
share of an economy’s trade with the rest of the economies that belong the same region, in total 
trade. 
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Table 2. Trends of Intra-Industry Trade in East Asia and Europe (percentage) 
1980 1990 1999  
IIT-2 IIT-3 IIT-4 IIT-2 IIT-3 IIT-4 IIT-2 IIT-3 IIT-4 
East Asia          
China 17.7 14.2 13.5 60.7 55.8 51.7 45.8 42.7 39.0 
Hong Kong 45.1 42.2 41.1 58.4 57.1 55.8 56.8 56.6 56.5 
Indonesia 33.6 6.7 5.8 34.1 17.2 13.6 44.9 36.1 26.0 
Japan 29.8 18.4 16.4 37.5 30.3 28.2 56.4 49.3 41.0 
Korea 35.8 30.2 28.2 44.4 40.1 37.9 43.4 36.0 32.8 
Malaysia 39.6 27.3 23.1 48.6 44.1 40.1 68.9 64.9 56.5 
Philippines 23.4 19.3 14.9 41.8 30.4 25.8 59.9 54.7 45.2 
Singapore 34.2 25.5 22.3 57.9 47.2 42.4 74.1 68.2 61.9 
Taiwan 23.1 17.8 12.2 32.0 30.0 26.0 60.4 56.4 48.1 
Thailand 30.3 24.6 22.0 41.3 37.3 34.3 49.9 46.6 42.7 
Average 31.3 22.6 20.0 45.7 38.9 35.6 56.1 51.1 45.0 
          
Europe          
Austria 60.4 52.7 47.1 70.5 60.2 53.5 71.2 63.5 56.9 
Denmark 58.7 50.8 44.4 66.9 56.5 49.5 72.0 63.0 53.8 
Finland 49.7 43.4 40.5 59.0 54.0 48.9 63.6 51.1 45.4 
France 78.2 65.9 60.0 79.3 71.2 64.3 79.4 71.7 66.1 
GBR 74.9 66.8 61.1 79.1 72.3 65.5 83.2 74.3 65.9 
Germany 67.1 62.7 59.4 71.6 68.0 64.5 71.1 68.2 64.1 
Greece 42.6 22.0 16.5 39.1 30.5 23.2 32.4 26.1 21.0 
Ireland 60.4 55.0 45.7 71.6 62.9 51.9 69.5 58.3 49.3 
Italy 71.4 58.4 52.9 69.7 60.6 53.9 72.4 63.9 56.2 
Netherlands 70.7 63.0 55.9 73.3 65.8 58.9 70.8 62.3 56.7 
Norway 58.4 50.6 46.3 65.1 52.5 47.6 64.5 48.4 43.2 
Portugal 32.4 26.4 21.2 45.8 40.3 32.7 54.9 49.0 40.7 
Sweden 65.9 58.4 54.7 71.9 64.1 59.3 77.3 66.2 61.1 
Average 60.8 52.0 46.6 66.4 58.4 51.8 67.9 58.9 52.3 
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Table 3. Foreign Reserve of Asian and Other Countries 
(In millions US dollar) 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Japan 207,335 207,866 203,215 277,708 347,212 387,727 
China 105,029 139,890 144,959 154,675 165,574 212,165 
Korea 33,237 19,710 51,963 73,700 95,855 102,487 
Indonesia 17,820 16,087 22,401 26,245 28,280 27,048 
Malaysia 26,156 20,013 24,728 29,670 28,625 29,585 
Philippines 9,902 7,147 9,101 13,103 12,936 13,318 
Singapore 76,491 70,883 74,418 76,304 79,685 47,851 
Thailand 37,192 25,697 28,434 33,805 31,933 32,350 
Vietnam 1,719 1,973 2,000 3,325 3,416 3,660 
Cambodia 252 287 315 388 502 586 
Laos 159 100 106 101 139 138 
Myanmar 229 250 315 265 223 400 
ASEAN+31 515,521 509,903 561,955 689,289 794,380 857,315 
Hong Kong 63,808 92,804 89,601 96,236 107,542 111,155 
Taiwan 88,038 83,502 90,341 106,200 106,742 122,211 
Sub-Total 667,367 686,209 741,897 891,725 1,008,664 1,090,681 
Austria 21,861 18,605 20,918 14,016 13,492 11,444 
Belgium 15,380 14,519 15,763 8,377 7,988 8,743 
Finland 6,205 7,532 8,508 6,747 7,330 7,192 
France 23,120 27,097 38,753 33,933 32,114 26,363 
Germany 75,803 69,853 64,133 52,661 49,667 43,615 
Greece 17,337 12,441 17,188 17,726 13,116 4,787 
Ireland 7,715 6,020 8,622 4,826 4,983 5,196 
Italy 44,064 53,431 25,447 18,623 22,423 20,905 
Luxembourg 29 24 NA NA NA NA 
Netherlands 24,119 21,881 17,536 6,499 7,004 5,930 
Portugal 15,359 15,130 15,067 8,006 8,539 9,228 
Spain 5,579 66,023 52,490 31,329 29,516 27,905 
EMU Total 256,571 312,556 284,425 202,743 196,172 171,308 
U.K. 37,123 28,878 27,363 30,077 39,281 31,938 
Swiss 36,775 36,899 38,346 34,176 30,854 30,134 
Canada 18,028 15,122 19,911 24,432 28,841 30,484 
U.S.A. 38,294 30,809 36,001 32,182 31,238 28,981 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 2002, Taiwan, Financial Statistics.  
1) Data on Brunei are not available, thus not included. 
 
 
